Non-ad valorem assessments on property are a fiscal innovation born from financial stress. Unable to raise property taxes due to limitations, many localities have turned to these charges as an alternative method to fund local services. In this paper, we seek to explain differential levels of non-ad valorem assessment financing through the analysis of property tax records of a large and diverse set of single family homes in California. We theorize that assessments, as opposed to other forms of taxation, will be used when residents hold anti-redistributive preferences. We show that assessment financing is most common in cities with high median household incomes and greater ethnic diversity. We also show that certain types of assessments, those with narrow geographic range, are frequently levied on expensive homes in poorer communities. We argue that this new form of financing exacerbates economic inequality by creating additional inequities in public service provisions.
In this paper we analyze the correlates of non-ad valorem assessment financing using a large and diverse sample of California single-family homes. We argue that assessments, as opposed to other forms of taxation, will be used when residents hold anti-redistributive preferences. We demonstrate that assessment financing is more common in cities with high median household incomes and greater ethnic diversity. We also show that certain types of assessments, those with the most limited geographic ranges, are most frequently levied on expensive homes in poorer communities. We argue that non-ad valorem assessments exacerbate economic disparities by creating additional inequities in the provision of public services. This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief historical overview of assessment financing in the United States, highlighting the evolution of this revenue source in the face of growing fiscal stress. Next, building on the recent literature on local political economy, we develop hypotheses about variation in the incidence of assessment financing and, in the subsequent section, test them using an original dataset of property tax bills in California.
The analysis is then expanded to more closely examine the narrowest types of assessment, what we deem "club assessments". The final section discusses the findings and considers the broader implications of non-ad valorem assessment financing for U.S. inequality.
The Rise of Non-Ad Valorem Assessments
Historically, general taxes and user fees represented the two primary sources of revenue raised locally by municipal governments. Taxes, whether from property, income, sales, or other sources, are universal in that all residents pay them, regardless of whether they use or want the public services funded by their tax dollars. By contrast, user fees are charges collected from individuals who voluntarily take part in specific government programs and are collected roughly in proportion to the level of individual use (Mikesell 2010) . According to one scholar, non-ad valorem assessments are a "halfway house between the property tax and the user charge" (Land 1967, 89) . Like taxes, these assessments are compulsory in that the property owners within a geographically defined region are required to pay the levy, regardless of whether they desire or personally use the public services that the assessment funds. Like user fees, the amount charged to each person or entity is theoretically considered to be related to the level of service that is provided, often calculated as the amount of "benefit" the user is deemed to receive. This type of financing can provide a vehicle to provide local "club" goods -public goods with limited geographic reach that can not feasibly be paid for by user fees due to their non-excludable nature. 1 While rarely discussed in the literature, non-ad valorem taxes are not rare and not new.
The tradition of assessing non-ad valorem charges for certain public benefits dates back more than 700 years, when residents in one seaside England city were assessed for repairs made to nearby seawalls (Rosewater 1968) . The assessment was based on the proportion that each resident's property deemed to benefit. In the United States the first known use of this type of financing occurred in 1691 when New York City used assessments to finance the construction of street and water drainage systems (Misczynski 1978) . Misczynski estimates that by 1913 the largest U.S. cities obtained an average of 12 percent of their revenue from such assessments, with the four largest raising more than 20 percent of their funds in this way. Although assessments became less popular in the wake of the Great Depression due to a series of defaults 1 Club goods, like public goods, are non-excludable, producing strong incentives to free ride on their provision. 2 California Legislative Analyst's Office. 2012. "Understanding California's Property Taxes". Available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/tax/property-tax-primer-112912.aspx on bonds backed by assessment dollars, assessment financing, especially of infrastructure, was again on the rise in the second half of the twentieth century (Misczynski 1978) .
While non-ad valorem assessments can be found across the country, they are used extensively in California. Specifically, in California, they exist in three forms: special assessments, parcel taxes, and community facility district Mello-Roos taxes.
2 Special assessments are used to fund public services that provide benefits to real property, not the inhabitants of properties, an important distinction (California Legislative Analyst's Office 2012).
For example, legally, special assessments can be used to fund neighborhood lighting, parks, and street maintenance, but not schools. The amount charged to each property is calculated as the amount of benefit received by the property, determined by a "benefit engineer" who may or may not rely on rules of thumb such as local land-use designations, size of the property, length of the property line abutting a street but not value to make their calculations (Misczynski 1978) . In contrast, parcel taxes can be used for a greater breadth of services, including schools, libraries, or matters of public safety. Here, the primary limitation is on the calculation of charges; all parcel taxes must be assessed equally across properties ("parcels"), regardless of the property value, size, or benefit received. Finally, Mello-Roos taxes are the most flexible form of non-ad valorem assessment. They can fund any type of public service and be levied based on a variety of formulas
The mechanism for adopting these three forms of non-ad valorem assessments varies.
Special assessments can be adopted by a majority of property owners whose votes are weighted by their properties' expected benefits (see Kogan and McCubbins 2008 For most of their history, non-ad valorem assessments in California have been used to finance the construction of infrastructure projects with clearly limited geographic reach. For example, assessments have paid for the construction of roads in remote areas, with each property owner contributing in proportion to the length of their property that is adjacent to the roadway.
Most frequently assessments have been used to build projects that benefited both specific property owners and the community nearby, such as neighborhood lighting and sidewalks.
However, the scope of special assessment financing has greatly expanded over the last three decades.
In large part, this expansion has been fueled by the growing limits to local governments' ability to increase general taxes in order to provide public services (Kogan and McCubbins 2008) . In an important 1979 decision California courts ruled that Proposition 13, a constitutional amendment approved by California voters the year before that greatly limited local property taxes, did not cover special assessments. Although assessments usually appear on the property tax bill received by homeowners, an appellate court ruled that a "special assessment is charged to real property to pay for benefits that property has received from a local improvement and, strictly speaking, is not a tax at all" (County of Fresno v. Malmstrom 1979) . The potential of non-ad valorem assessments to replace revenue lost due to Proposition 13 quickly became apparent to observers in and outside of government. Testifying at a 1986 hearing, one state lawmaker noted that "benefit assessments have become a growth industry in California" and the California For example, the city of San Francisco adopted a flat $198 parcel tax to support teacher salaries. Similarly, the city of Davis assesses a flat fee, currently $99 for single-family homes, to support its city's libraries. The assessment districts that employ this strategy are generally larger in geographic reach, encompassing an entire city or school district. They most commonly set aside taxes for a specific purpose, though there are exceptions. For example, the city of Fairfax uses parcel taxes to charge residents a flat $125 per parcel for "General Purposes."
5 http://www.kpbs.org/news/2014/jan/21/poway-unified-kids-cant-attend-new-school-because-/ as well as analysis of individual property tax records of residents of Poway's CFD #6. 6 The arguments against this special tax as they appeared on the official San Francisco voter information guide focused entirely on the distributional impact of this financing choice. As argued by Howard Epstein, the chairman of San Francisco's Republic Party, "The proponents of Proposition A had other options. Instead, they decided to place the burden on the City's small property owners. Under what conditions will taxpayers prefer to create taxing or assessment districts rather than raise general taxes? While the nature of the public service surely plays an important role in this decision, we argue that the local social and economic context helps determine what financing mechanism individuals will prefer to use to finance local government. In turn, this decision helps define the population of residents who are allowed to enjoy the services provided by their municipalities or the progressivity of the financing mechanism used to support services.
In many ways, the decision to form a district instead of relying on general taxation Similarly, these same considerations are relevant to preferences for progressive taxation (Melzter and Richards 1981; Foster 2013 ). As such, we predict that the same socioeconomic conditions will explain patterns in the creation of assessment districts as well.
Our first hypothesis focuses on the economic status of California residents. We argue that the decision to pursue the creation of assessment districts hinges on the interests and motivation of higher-income taxpayers. Much as described by Miller (1981) for the decision to privatize or contract out public service when possible, well-off residents will prefer to finance public services through assessments rather than taxes. 7 Using assessments allows wealthy taxpayers to limit the redistributive impact of local budgetary decisions either by ensuring that their contributions will be used to finance only public services in wealthy areas or with a flat 7 Miller has argued that residents of richer cities substituted private insurance for fire service and contracted out police, library, and other municipal services.
payment formula. In contrast, when the economic profile of local residents is relatively low income, taxpayers will have little reason to prefer assessment financing over general taxation.
This logic of this prediction is rooted in the key insights from the canonical Meltzer and Richard (1981) model of redistribution that suggests that the income of the median voter is a pivotal determinant of redistribution, as well as well-established research findings that, as noted by Alesina and Giuliano, "the richer you are, the less you favor redistribution" (2009, 13).
Historically, there is strong evidence that assessments have been used to blunt redistributive spending within city governments. In her provocative study of nineteenth-century Chicago politics, Einhorn (1991) argues that assessment financing was used as a vehicle by wealthy property owners to limit service provision to low-income residents. "American city government in the nineteenth century," she writes, "worked on the principle that the distribution of services was equitable when each city dweller got what he paid for, no more and no less" (1991, 8) . Einhorn shows that while services funded by general taxation, such as the sewer system, were provided to areas across the city, paved streets -funded through special assessments -were heavily concentrated in the wealthiest neighborhoods (1991, 141) .
Second, recent work in the field of political economy has emphasized racial heterogeneity as a barrier to local public goods provision. Scholars have argued that ethnic diversity impedes the willingness of residents to tax themselves out of worry that the benefits of their investments will be captured by people much different than themselves, and diverted to policies they do not support (Alesina, Baqir, Easterly 1999; Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Easterly and Levine 1997; Glaser 2002; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Poterba 1994; Putnam 2007; Rugh and Trounstine 2011) . In addition, Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) show that racial heterogeneity has historically been associated with local government fragmentation within U.S. local government and has posed a major barrier to government consolidation.
For residents who prefer to support public services only if they benefit people who look like them but who reside in diverse municipalities, assessments represent an attractive solution.
For example, white voters living on the outskirts of a large urban city may prefer higher levels of fire protection but be reluctant to increase citywide taxes for fear that their money will be used to subsidize other services provided to minority inner-city residents. By creating an assessment district, these voters can receive the services they desire while limiting the benefits provided to members of other ethnic groups living in other neighborhoods. In short, we expected higher levels of ethnic diversity to encourage greater reliance on assessment financing rather than citywide taxation.
Data and Methods
This paper seeks to identify the conditions under which taxpayers will prefer to use nonad valorem assessments to fund local public services. To answer this question, we looked for patterns in the frequency and use of non-ad valorem assessments across California, combining data from individual homes with aggregate data on community characteristics. This information was then used to test the hypotheses that economic wealth and ethnic diversity encourage greater reliance on assessment financing but not traditional taxation.
In particular, we are interested in comparing the factors correlated with non-ad valorem assessment financing to the factors associated with the use of general obligation bonds. As in most states, most property owners in California pay both types of charges through their property tax bills in addition to standard property taxes. 8 The key differences between non-ad valorem assessments and general obligation bonds is: 1) the scope of their geographic reach, and / or 2) reliance on a tax rate contingent on property valuation; general obligation bonds are universally based on assessed property values and must be approved by the entire voting population of a city, county, or school district. We argue that non-ad valorem assessment use varies based on the wealth and the ethnic diversity of cities as a function of preferences to limit the redistributive nature of taxation and public service provision. This hypothesized pattern will occur more for assessments than bond obligations.
To explore the different foundations of ad valorem taxes versus non-ad valorem assessments it was necessary to collect itemized tax data for a set of individual properties. While tax data exists at various levels of aggregation, it is not finely itemized so that we can explore these differences. This will lead us, ultimately, to multi-level analysis.
We thus began our investigation by drawing a random sample of 1,000 California residential addresses using the California voter registration roll. 9 From that sample, 675 property tax bills for the 2009-10 fiscal year were located by contacting local county tax collectors.
Property tax records could not be located for the remaining observations, either because the property did not exist or because it was not a single-family home. The analysis was limited to single-family homes in order to estimate the distribution of burden for individual households. A large apartment complex has only a single tax bill and there is no way to calculate per-unit costs from this information.
We coded each distinct charge that appears on the property tax bill. For a typical tax bill, this includes the base property tax obligation governed by Proposition 13 (one percent of assessed value), payments for voter-approved general obligation bonds, non-ad valorem assessments, and, on occasion, charges related to utility and sewer access. All utility and sewer charges were coded separately from assessments in order to ensure that the data was comparable across all counties. In some counties utility charges appear on separate water or utility bills instead of property tax bills, complicating direct comparisons.
In aggregate, our data collection efforts identified a total of $209,139 in non-ad valorem assessments. This is similar to the amount of taxes paid through voter-approved bonds ($268,129) but significantly less than that paid by regular property taxes ($2,330,929).
Individual non-ad valorem assessment charges ranged from small fees, such as a sixty-six-cent charge associated with a flood protection district in Yuba City, CA, to more significant items such as a levy of over $10,000 used for maintaining landscaping and lighting in a neighborhood of multi-million dollar mansions in Orange County. 10 The most common assessment charges were for the purposes of vector or flood control, though assessments fund a wide variety of public services such as schools, parks, libraries, and even emergency medical ambulances and public safety services.
Basic summary statistics for the dependent variables and all explanatory variables included in the analysis are reported in Table 1 . The parcels in the sample comprise 38 unique counties and 227 unique census places. Among the 675 single-family homes in our sample, tax and assessment burdens of 614 parcels were analyzed. Nineteen parcels were eliminated from analysis because they were located in non-populous areas whose community characteristics could not be quantified. An additional thirty-nine parcels were eliminated because no information was available on their property values or the year the home was built. Finally, an additional two parcels were removed due to their status as outliers. 11 This leaves us with 614
observations.
Information gathered from individual property tax bills was supplemented with data from the Census Bureau and Zillow Inc. to gain additional information about the parcels and their surrounding areas. These additional variables controlled for other factors that affect financing choices and additional parcel-to-parcel variation.
We chose to measure many of our independent variables at the level of the census place using five-year estimates from the American Community Survey dataset (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . Census places are roughly equivalent to cities, both incorporated and unincorporated. In our sample, census places range from populations of 407 (Westly, CA) to almost 4 million (Los Angeles, CA). City-level variables are important to the analysis because decisions to approve bonds or 11 We choose to winsorize the dataset, excluding these two outliers who had home values of over $7 million dollars. Results without these omitted parcels are available as supplementary material.
otherwise raise general government revenues will often reflect considerations at the city level.
For this reason both of the key variables (ethnic heterogeneity and median income) as well as control variables (population and population density) were measured at this level of analysis.
The measure of city wealth was operationalized as median family income. We focused on the median member of a community as a proxy for the income of a median voter 12 . We theorized that median family income would be positively associated with the usage of non-ad valorem assessments since, all else equal, a wealthy median voter would be less likely to favor redistributive taxation (Alesina and Giuliano 2009 ). We do not expect the same relationship for general obligations bonds, as they are relatively more redistributive. Table 2 displays mean assessment and bond taxes by quintiles of city median income, providing preliminary support for our hypothesis that city wealth uniquely explains assessment financing.
Our second hypothesis concerns racial and ethnic diversity. To measure this we use the Herfindahl index of ethnic diversity. A Herfindahl index is a statistical representation of the relative concentrations of firms or groups on a scale of zero to one. It was first used by economists to gauge the size of firms within industries to identify monopolies, but has been subsequently used by social scientists as a measure of ethnic diversity (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 2007) . The Herfindahl index is calculated using the relative size of different ethnic 12 We recognize that the median voter may not be the pivotal actor in taxation and assessment decisions. Many assessments require two-thirds approval and/or require the vote or property owners, not registered voters. We justify this operationalization both with the ubiquity of the median voter theorem's application in poltical decision making, as well as the recognition that median family income would be highly correlated with the level income at other percentiles. We also recognize that the median of the income distribution might not be the median wealth of the voting distribution. As long as income and wealth are determined by some underlying charecteristics however, and as long as property owners are eligible to vote, this measure should be adequately represent our idealized construct.
groups according to census estimates. 13 An area is coded as one on the Herfindahl index if it is composed entirely of a single ethnic group, while a number closer to zero represents high levels of ethnic diversity. To ease interpretation, this coding was reversed so that high numbers represent higher levels of diversity. We expected that higher levels of diversity would be associated with higher levels of assessments. Table 2 also displays the mean assessments and bond taxes for our sample by quintiles of city ethnic diversity, providing preliminary support for our hypothesis that racial differences uniquely explain assessment financing, not bond financing.
In addition to city-level data, we are able to measure and control for two important variables at the individual level of the individual parcel. Specifically, data from Zillow Inc. was used to achieve a more-precise estimate of the market value for each parcel as well as the year that the individual property was built. Zillow publishes monthly estimates of home values known as "Zestimates". Zestimates are computed using a proprietary formula based on house attributes, neighborhood attributes, and nearby real-estate transactions. 14 Estimates computed for August 1, 2010 were employed. We theorized that more expensive homes would have greater assessment burdens. Since bond obligations are calculated based on assessed value, which is correlated with market value, we also expected a positive correlation between individual home value and bond taxes. Table 2 , using quintiles of Zestimates, also confirms these expectations, as well as the expectation that assessments will be less progressive than bond taxes. 13 The path in creating any index is to take something that is multidimensional and to measure it with a unidimensional variable. This is arguably fine as long as we can think of the construct of diversity as a single dimension. 14 More information about the computation of Zestimates is available at http://www.zillow.com/zestimate/.
Zillow also provides public information on the year each home was built. The age of local housing stock should also play an important role in determining the number of special charges assessed by local governments. Many of the statutes governing the creation of assessment districts were adopted following Proposition 13 in 1978, and generally made it easier to impose assessments on newly built rather than existing housing units (see Kogan and McCubbins' 2008 discussion of Mello-Roos districts). As a result, newer homes tend to have higher reliance on assessment financing than older homes because the transaction costs of district formation are substantially lower in newer versus older neighborhoods (Baer and Feiock 2005) . Table 2 also shows both mean assessments and bond taxes by quintiles of year built, confirming our expectations that the age of the home is uniquely related to assessments. To capture the interaction of legal and economic changes on the propensity of homes of different ages to carry assessments, we transform age into a series of dummy variables, demarcating pre-1930, 1930-1949, 1950-1978, 1979-2000, and 2001-2010 . The first two categories roughly demonstrate the pre-Great Depression, with the second demonstrating the Great Depression and World War II eras, the third captures the post-war growth period prior to Proposition 13, while the last two time periods are demarcated by Proposition 13 (1978) and Proposition 39 (2000).
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In we show how these age cutoffs affect non-ad valorem assessments (excluding utility charges). As expected these assessments were higher on homes built prior to the Great Depression. Assessment districts, due to defaults, fell out of favor during the Great Depression, explaining the decline in their use for the next two periods. The biggest changes can be seen in the post tax-revolt periods.
Regression analysis was used to identify the correlates of non-ad valorem assessments.
The occurrence of assessments was predicted by using city-level ethnic diversity and income. In the regression analysis, we also controlled for a city's population and population density. The key predictions were that assessments would be more prevalent in areas with high levels of ethnic diversity and wealth. Separate Poisson regressions were used to predict the total amount collected through non-ad valorem assessments versus bonds levied on each property. Poisson estimation is appropriate because assessments and bond payments are always non-negative and sometimes zero. Calculating the mean squared error out of sample for half of the data validated this choice; Poisson estimation had a lower mean squared error than models that employed OLS, Tobit, or GLM with a log-link.
As noted, the variables employed are at multiple levels of analysis. The dependent variables and two explanatory variables (home value and year built) were measured at the parcel level. The other variables, derived from census estimates, exist at the level of a census place.
Although the sample was drawn randomly, random selection alone does not imply independence.
Indeed, we theorized that two parcels in the same city would be more alike, likely in unobservable and unmeasured ways, than two parcels in different geographical areas. This unobserved correlation violates the Gauss-Markov assumption of independence of errors.
Because positive correlation in the error terms was expected, ignoring this issue could lead to a type 1 error (incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis). As such, all models employ clustered standard errors by census place.
Results
The results of the Poisson regression estimation appear in Table 3 . The first model presents the results for non-ad valorem assessments while the second model presents the results for general obligation bonds. The dependent variable in both models is the total amount of money owed for these items by a homeowner on their property tax bill. The comparative results are useful because they show that these different forms of public financing have systematically distinct origins.
A city's median family income was a significant predictor of both assessments and, to a lesser extent (significance <p.10) and contrary to our expectations, general obligation bonds.
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The finding for assessments is consistent with our hypothesis that well-off residents -in particular a relatively well-off median voter⎯will prefer to finance public services through assessments rather than taxes. Figure 2 displays the predicted level of assessments and bonds relative to changes on income from the 10 th to 90 th percentiles. For example, moving from the 25 th percentile ($56,000) to 75 th percentile ($88,000) of city median family income was associated with a $81 increase in non-ad valorem assessments, all else equal. In contrast, the relationship between median income and bond taxes was weaker (and only significant at the 10% level), a $34 marginal effect between the 25 th to 75 th percentiles. Because median family income was measured at the city level, these results must be interpreted as averages among citizens within a city. It is possible, as we will explore in greater depth later, than averages conceal important differences at an individual level.
The second hypothesis that non-ad valorem assessments are more common in areas of high ethnic diversity was also confirmed. increase monotonically with year home built, perhaps a consequence of the fact that, as a result of Proposition 13, the assessed value of newer homes is closer to market value than older homes.
Non-ad valorem assessments were not associated with larger and denser cities. The coefficients for the two variables measuring both population characteristics were all insignificant in the model for assessments, but positive and significant correlates of bond obligations. This fits with the importance of new developments in the issuance of assessments, given that morepopulous and dense communities are more likely to be long-established communities.
Finally, individual home value as measured by Zestimate predicted both assessments and bonds, though assessments only at the 10% level of significance. Moving from the 25 th ($232,000) to the 75 th ($574,000) percentile in this variable was associated with a $41 change in assessments and a $63 change in bond obligations. The larger coefficient and greater significance for this variable on bond taxes aligns with the expectation that bond taxes are be relatively more progressive than assessments.
Within City Variation: An Analysis of "Club" Assessments
We have shown that city level characteristics are strongly associated with the usage of non-ad valorem assessment. In addition to this overall correlation, we expect that intra-city dynamics affect the allocation of assessments at a more micro-level. Recall, assessment do not need to be levied by pre-existing forms of governments (cities, counties, or school districts).
Indeed, it is common for assessment districts to be drawn at a neighborhood level.
To better explore these dynamics, we recode our dependent variable to exclusively capture assessments that are smaller than existing government boundaries (generally, cityboundaries, though potentially school district boundaries in the case of single-school levies)
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We deem these types of assessments "club" assessments, a reference to the economic literature on "club goods", public goods that are non-rival but excludable. Here, the drawing of district lines within existing government boundaries define excludability.
To recode our dependent variable we individually examined all charges that appeared on property tax bills, summing only those that could be categorized as club assessments.
Assessment charges on property tax bills always include descriptions of their purpose. It was sometimes possible to code the geographic scope of the assessment district from this information alone. For example, landscape and lighting assessments differentiated by "zones" are indicative of club assessments. Often, however, it was necessary to evaluate additional public documents to correctly code geographic scope. Districts formed to assess Mello-Roos taxes, for example, can either encompass mere blocks or entire cities. In these instances, public records, for example maps of assessment districts or the full-text of the districts adoption by ballot measure, were obtained to ensure accurate coding.
Club assessments account for 61% of all non ad-valorem assessments analyzed in this paper, or $142 on average per single-family home. Although we maintain that overall assessment financing is used more in wealthier communities, we also expect wealthy residents of poorer communities to utilize this public service financing option at significant levels. This form of assessment allows property owners to limit redistribution by defining a limited geographic scope of the public services provided.
To test for differential effects in rich and poor communities, we split our model in half, analyzing cities whose median family incomes is above and below the sample median ($72,600) separately. Table 4 provides our analysis of club assessments. Our findings are robust to the alternative model specification of a multiplicative interaction effect (results available in appendix This finding is likely in line with our theory of assessments, that their limited geographic scope is used to blunt redistribution to poorer neighbors. These findings are displayed visually in Figure 8 .
In contrast, home value operates similarly in poor and rich cities for general obligation bonds. In both types of city, the effect of home value is positive and significant. In terms of marginal effects, moving from the 25 th to 75 th percentiles increases bond obligations from $192 to $333 in poor cities and $224 to $277 in wealthy cities. We do not offer any explanation for the larger marginal effect in poorer cities.
Conclusion
Rising inequality has represented one of the most salient economic and political developments in the second half of the twentieth century (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2010) . The growing gap between haves and have-nots has also had an important spatial dimension. Geographic sorting, best exemplified by white flight to the suburbs that was accelerated by the federal government's promotion of homeownership and the construction of the interstate highway system, has remade U.S. political geography and created interregional disparities in the level of public-service provision (e.g., Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2004; Musso 2001; Nall 2012) . This has shown how recent innovations in public financing have also contributed to socioeconomic balkanization, not only between but also within U.S. cities.
Overall, the results presented in this paper provide some initial evidence that how local governments are financed has important implications for who gets to take advantage of the services that these agencies provide. The findings show that efforts to limit property taxesand the resulting innovations in public finance that these limitations engender -have affected not only how much revenue local governments can raise but also the identity of the constituents who pay and to whom services are delivered. Our results suggest that in areas of wealth and high ethnic diversity, non-ad valorem assessments allow taxpayers to restrict access to public services and progressivity of taxation.
Of course, limiting redistribution may have been one of the original motivations for the tax revolt. Some scholars have suggested that in California Proposition 13 may have had its roots in a series of state Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s that found local inequality in public school financing to be unconstitutional and ordered the state to take steps to equalize the resources available to school districts. These decisions broke the link between the level of property taxes raised by local governments and the amount of money available to local schools.
Proposition 13 passed just as the state legislature had begun to take steps to implement the court's decisions. The ability to use non-ad valorem assessments to create hyperlocal service provision may be one reason voters rejected a second constitutional amendment in the 1980s, promoted by one of the original authors of Proposition 13, that sought to include assessments in the property tax limitation adopted in 1978 (Kogan and McCubbins 1986) .
We conclude with a word of caution about indicting non-ad valorem assessment financing on the grounds that it perpetuates or exacerbates existing social and economic inequality. Throughout this work we assumed that the only two choices available to taxpayers were financing local services through higher taxes or by creating assessment districts. Of course, other options are available: to move out of their city, or to secede and incorporate as a separate municipality. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that the desire to avoid the high taxes of the inner city represents one of the main drivers of suburban incorporation (see, e.g., Miller 1981; Burns 1994; Hoene, Baldassare, and Shires 2002) . To the extent that assessments allow struggling inner cities to "keep their suburbs" (Rusk 2003) by providing a viable alternative to relocation and separate incorporation, they may be better than the alternatives, despite their democratic flaws.
